Crowdsensing is a new paradigm which takes advantage of the pervasive smartphones to collect and analyze data beyond the scale of what was previously possible. Appropriate incentives are necessary to compensate smartphone users for the resource consumption while participating in crowdsensing. In this talk, I will discuss how to design incentive mechanisms for two crowdsensing models: the platform-centric model, where the platform provides a reward shared by participating users, and the user-centric model, where users have more control over the payment they will receive. For the platform-centric model, I will present an incentive mechanism using a Stackelberg game, where the platform is the leader while the users are the followers. I will show how to compute the unique Stackelberg Equilibrium, at which the utility of the platform is maximized, and none of the users can improve its utility by unilaterally deviating from its current strategy. For the user-centric model, I will present an auction-based incentive mechanism, which is computationally efficient, individually rational, profitable, and truthful.