

On the Characterization and Optimization of On-Chip Cache Reliability against Soft Errors

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Abstract—Soft errors induced by energetic particle strikes in on-chip cache memories have become an increasing challenge in designing new generation reliable microprocessors. Previous efforts have exploited information redundancy via parity/ECC codings or cacheline duplication for information integrity in on-chip cache memories. Due to various performance, area/size, and energy constraints in various target systems, many existing unoptimized protection schemes may eventually prove significantly inadequate and ineffective. In this paper, we propose a new framework for conducting comprehensive studies and characterization on the reliability behavior of cache memories, in order to provide insight into cache vulnerability to soft errors as well as design guidance to architects for highly efficient reliable on-chip cache memory design. Our work is based on the development of new lifetime models for data and tag arrays residing in both the data and instruction caches. Those models facilitate the characterization of cache vulnerability of stored items at various lifetime phases. We then exemplify this design methodology by proposing reliability schemes targeting at specific vulnerable phases. Benchmarking is carried out to showcase the effectiveness of our approaches.

Index Terms—Cache, Reliability, Soft Error, Temporal Vulnerability Factor.

I. INTRODUCTION

With continuous technology scaling down, microprocessors are becoming more susceptible to soft errors induced by energetic particle strikes, such as high-energy neutrons from cosmic rays, and alpha particles from decaying radioactive impurities in packaging and interconnect materials [2][3]. Due to their large share of the transistor budget and die area, on-chip caches suffer from an increasing vulnerability to soft errors [4]. As a critical requirement for reliable computing [5], protecting the information integrity in cache memories has captured a wealth of research efforts [5][6][7][8][9][10][11][12][13].

Information redundancy is fundamental in building reliable memory structures. Various coding schemes are used to protect information integrity in latches, register files, and on-chip caches, providing different levels of reliability at different performance, energy, and hardware costs. For example, simple parity coding is capable of detecting the odd number of bit errors but is not able to recover from detected errors. On the other hand, error correcting codes (ECCs) typically provide single error correction and double error detection (SEC-DED). However, the performance overhead and additional energy consumption due to ECC encoding/decoding make ECC a reluctant choice for high speed on-chip caches, i.e., L1 data cache and L1 instruction cache [5]. Another form of information redundancy is to maintain redundant copies of the data in cache memories [6][14]. In these schemes, cachelines are

duplicated when they are brought to L1 caches on read/write misses or on write operations. During a cache write (store), the replicas should be also updated with the latest value. On a cache read (load) operation, multiple copies may need to be read out and compared against each other to verify the absence of soft errors or to perform majority voting. Notice that maintaining redundant copies of cachelines presents great challenges to the bandwidth and power dissipation of the caches [5][14].

Despite the fact that most of the previous works have studied tradeoffs between performance, energy consumption, area overheads and the achieved cache reliability for their proposed schemes, a more systematic study of cache vulnerability is still needed. Such a study could provide enough insight into cache reliability behavior, that the designer could take advantage of to design highly cost-effective reliable caches. Recent papers [8][9][10][11][15][16] present some initial efforts towards such a cache vulnerability analysis. However, their cacheline- or word-based vulnerability characterization used some simple generation model [17] that could not explore the temporal vulnerability of the cache, i.e., how different lifetime phases of the cache data contribute to vulnerability. This temporal information is of critical importance in determining *which data* in the cache should be protected at *what time* with *which protection schemes*, in order to achieve high reliability. In this paper, we target at providing such a bridge from perception to practice in designing reliable caches.

For the aforementioned purpose, we develop a detailed lifetime model for the data arrays in the L1 data and instruction caches, as the first step, to capture all possible activities that could involve these data items. A data item under consideration can be at various granularities such as cacheline, sub-block, word, half word, byte, or even bit. In the data cache, the new lifetime model distinguishes among nine lifetime phases for each data item according to the previous activity and the current one, and further categorizes them into two groups, *vulnerable* and *non-vulnerable* phases. A vulnerable phase is characterized by the fact that any error occurring during this phase has the potential to propagate either to the CPU (by load operations) or to the L2 cache (via a dirty line writeback). We define the cache temporal vulnerability factor (TVF) as the percentage of data items present in vulnerable phases over all possible data items that the cache can hold, an average along the time axis. Therefore, the temporal vulnerability factor indicates how reliable the cache is. A smaller value of TVF implies that the cache is more resilient to soft errors.

To derive highly cost-effective reliability schemes for on-chip cache memories, we propose a new design methodology

driven by TVF characterization and analysis. First, we perform a cacheline-based TVF analysis on the entire data array. The results show that the vulnerable phase *write-replace* (WPL, the lifetime phase between the last write and the replacement without any read in between) contributes the most to TVF in the data cache. A writethrough data cache can effectively eliminate this phase by immediately writing back the data to the L2 cache after a store operation. However, the excessive accesses to the L2 cache degrade the performance and increase the energy consumption. An alternative to solve this problem is to early write back dirty lines, such as the deadtime based early writeback (DTEWB) scheme in [7]. Our further analysis indicated that this cacheline-based analysis cannot fully capture the nature of CPU accesses to the data cache. Since the unit size for data cache accesses is the byte, different bytes in the same cacheline may be in different lifetime phases at any given time, e.g., some bytes in a dirty cacheline may be in the clean state. Treating all the bytes in a cacheline equally may lead to inaccurate calculation of the cache TVF. We conclude that fine-grain (e.g., byte-based) lifetime models should be considered for more accurate TVF characterization. Based on the byte-level analysis, we also propose the multiple-dirty-bits (MDB) scheme to further reduce the WPL vulnerable phase as well as the energy consumption during the writeback.

After WPL optimization, the vulnerable phase *read-read* (RR, the lifetime phase between two consecutive reads of a clean data item) with the potential to propagate errors to the CPU raises as another major part in the vulnerability factor of the data cache. Our study shows that a 87.8% majority of RRs have a short time interval ($\leq 0.5K$ cycles) and account for only 15.5% of the overall RR vulnerable intervals. Based on this observation, we propose a clean cacheline invalidation (CCI) scheme to invalidate clean lines after being idle for a certain amount of time. Note that this scheme may result in performance loss when the invalidated cachelines are accessed lately by the CPU. However, by carefully choosing the invalidation interval, we can keep the induced performance overhead to a minimum. Our further analysis on data items in cachelines shows that a significant portion of stored data is narrow width data, which complies with previous research findings [18][19][20][21][22][23][24][25][26][27][28]. In this work, we propose to integrate a narrow-width value compression (NWVC) scheme with the lifetime models for further reducing the WPL, RR, and other vulnerable phases. The *Combined* scheme with DTEWB, MDB, CCI and NWVC achieves a significantly reduced TVF of 3.5% compared to the original 39.2% of the data array in the data cache, at a minor performance loss of 0.7%.

Different from the data cache, the instruction cache is read-only (from the datapath side) and this read-only activity dramatically simplifies the lifetime model for the data array in the instruction cache. In this lifetime model, RR is the only vulnerable phase. To optimize this RR phase, we first exploit the clean cacheline invalidation (CCI) scheme, similarly to the data cache. However, the experimental results show that the performance loss due to the instruction cache CCI is much higher than for the data cache CCI. This is mainly because of the high pipeline stall penalty due to increased instruction

cache misses incurred by the CCI scheme. To reduce the performance overhead, we propose a variation of the cacheline scrubbing (CS) scheme to scrub idle clean lines from the L2 cache. While reducing the RR phase without significantly impacting the performance, the scrubbing scheme dramatically increases the accesses to the L2 cache. Consequently, we further propose to combine the CCI and CS schemes to optimize the RR phase while minimizing the performance and energy overheads. Our evaluation results show that the CS-CCI scheme effectively reduces the TVF of the instruction cache data array from 19.9% to 5.3% at a 0.9% performance loss and a 29% energy increase in the L2 cache.

Previous work [29] has studied the fault behavior of CAM (content addressable memory) tags and provided single-error tolerant solutions to protect them. A functional level design framework was also proposed in [30] for implementing a fault-tolerant/self-checking CAM architecture, with a focus on CAM cell designs. To provide a comprehensive view of cache reliability, we also strive to study the reliability behavior in the tag array for both the data and instruction caches. During an access to a set-associative cache, all tags in the same set are read out and compare simultaneously with the tag in the CPU-issued address, which puts the tags of valid cachelines into a vulnerable phase. However, if a single bit error is assumed, Hamming-distance-one analysis (HDO) [31] can be employed to dramatically reduce the TVF of the tag array. We develop a new lifetime model for the tag array to extend the Hamming-distance-one analysis. Furthermore, we study the effect of the early write back and clean cacheline invalidation schemes on optimizing the TVF of the tag arrays. In summary, the tag array TVF is reduced to 7.72% and 0.08% for the data and instruction caches from their original 46.7% and 0.3%, respectively.

The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section describes our experimental setup. In Section III, we introduce our lifetime model of the data array in the data cache. Then, we propose and evaluate several schemes to reduce its TVF. We use Section IV to analyze the data array vulnerability to soft errors in the instruction cache and propose our improving schemes. The study of the tag array in the data and instruction caches is conducted in Section V. Section VI concludes this work.

II. EXPERIMENTAL SETUP

We derive our simulator from SimpleScalar V3.0 [32] to model a contemporary high-performance microprocessor similar to Alpha 21364. In the new simulator, the original RUU (register update unit) structure is replaced by a separated integer issue queue, a floating-point issue queue, an integer register file, a floating-point register file, and an active list (a.k.a. the re-order buffer). A MIPS R10000 style register renaming scheme is adopted in our implementation. Table I gives the detailed configuration of the simulated microprocessor. Cacti 3.2 [33] is used for energy profiling (at 70nm technology) during the simulation.

For experimental evaluation, we use the SPEC CPU2000 benchmark suite [34] compiled for the Alpha instruction set

TABLE I
PARAMETERS OF THE SIMULATED PROCESSOR.

Processor Core	
Datapath Width	4 inst. per cycle
Int Issue Queue	20 entries
FP Issue Queue	15 entries
Load/Store Queue	64 entries
Active list (ACL)	80 entries
Int Register File	80 registers
FP Register File	72 registers
Function Units	4 IALU, 2 IMULT/IDIV 2 FALU, 1 FMULT/FDIV/FSQRT 2 MemPorts
Branch Predictor	
Branch Predictor	Alpha 21264 tournament predictor 32-entry RAS
BTB	2048-entry 2-way
Memory Hierarchy	
L1 I/DCache	64KB, 2 ways, 64B blocks, 2 cycles
L2 UCache	4MB, 8 ways, 128B blocks, 12 cycles
Memory	225 cycles first chunk, 12 cycles rest
TLB	Fully-assoc., 128 entries




Fig. 1. The lifetime of a cacheline with respect to various access activities.

architecture using the “-arch ev6 -non_shared” option with “peak” tuning. We use the reference input sets for this study. Each benchmark is first fast-forwarded to its early single simulation point (*gap* and *ammp* use the standard single simulation point instead of the very large early single simulation point) specified by SimPoint [35]. We use the last 100 million instructions during the fast-forwarding phase to warm-up the caches if the number of skipped instructions is more than 100 million. Then, we simulate the next 100 million instructions in detail.

III. TEMPORAL VULNERABILITY FACTOR OF THE DATA ARRAY IN DATA CACHES

A. A General Lifetime Model of the Data Array

In this section, we introduce our detailed lifetime model of the data array for the purpose of vulnerability characterization. A cacheline is first brought into the L1 data cache on a read

or write miss. The cacheline will be accessed at most a couple of times, either by reads or writes, and then may wait for a long time before it is replaced [17]. Such cacheline generation information can be exploited for cache leakage optimization [17]. However, it is not sufficient for reliability analysis. Notice that not all of the soft errors occurring in the data cache will result in a failure. If errors occur in the data field of invalid cachelines, they are simply masked off by the invalid bits and have no impact on the correctness of the execution. Errors occurring in the data field of clean cachelines after the last read are similarly masked off by the dirty bit ($= 0$) and, therefore, are discarded at replacement. Other errors may be overwritten by subsequent writes before a CPU read or a write back to the L2 cache, thus presenting no harm to reliability. In our new model, the lifetime of a data item, e.g., a cacheline, is divided into the following phases: WRR, RR, WR, WPL, WRPL, RPL, RW, WW, and Invalid. They are:

- WRR: lifetime phase between two consecutive reads of a dirty data item,
- RR: lifetime phase between two consecutive reads of a clean data item,
- WR: lifetime phase between a write and its first read,
- WPL: lifetime phase between the last write and the replacement without any read in between,
- WRPL: lifetime phase between the last read and the replacement of a dirty data item,
- RPL: lifetime phase between the last read and the replacement of a clean data item,
- RW: lifetime phase between the write and the last read before the write,
- WW: lifetime phase between two consecutive writes without any read in between,
- Invalid: lifetime phase when the data item is in the invalid state.

Figure 1 shows the correlation among these lifetime phases for typical data cache activities. We define in this paper a *vulnerable phase* as being a lifetime phase in which errors may propagate out of the cache, either to the CPU or to the lower level memory hierarchy, i.e., L2 caches. Clearly, the first five phases, WRR, RR, WR, WPL, and WRPL, are vulnerable because errors occurring in phases WRR, RR, or WR will have the opportunity to be read by the CPU, and errors occurring in phases WPL or WRPL will have the opportunity to propagate to the L2 cache. RPL and Invalid are *non-vulnerable phases* since errors occurring during these two phases will be discarded or ignored. However, phases RW and WW present different vulnerability behavior for data items at different granularities. If the data item is a byte, RW and WW are non-vulnerable phases. Otherwise, RW and WW are *potential vulnerable phases*. We elaborate on this vulnerability characteristic of RW and WW in the following section.

B. Temporal Vulnerability Factor (TVF)

The cache temporal vulnerability factor (TVF) introduced in this work is defined as the average rate of data items in vulnerable phases over the total data items that the cache can

accommodate along the timeline. TVF can be calculated as follows:

$$TVF_{Cache} = \frac{\sum_i^n (data_item_i * \sum_j vul_phase_j)}{\sum (data_item * Exec_Time)}, \quad (1)$$

where $data_item_i$ can be a cacheline, a word, or a byte, vul_phase_j is the time of j^{th} vulnerable phase of $data_item_i$, and $Exec_Time$ is the total time simulated for the benchmark.

We use the vulnerability factor to evaluate the reliability of the data cache. If the data cache has a high vulnerability factor, it has more data items in vulnerable phases during the execution, thus is more vulnerable to soft errors. Therefore, a main objective in designing a reliable data cache is to reduce its vulnerability factor. Notice that the temporal vulnerability factor (TVF) is different from the architectural vulnerability factor (AVF) [36] of the data cache. Since soft errors induced during the vulnerable phases in the data cache only present the potential to crash the execution or the lower memory hierarchies, TVF defines the upper bound on AVF and can be estimated more accurately than AVF. Further, TVF is also different from the critical time [15] in that the critical time is calculated based on the word-level vulnerability analysis while TVF is derived from a flexible lifetime model for detailed vulnerability analysis at various granularities, e.g., a cacheline, a word, or a byte.

C. Data Array Vulnerability Characterization

In this section, we perform both cacheline based and byte based vulnerability characterization, and analyze the deficiency of the cacheline based scheme.

1) *A Cacheline based Characterization:* In conventional cache designs, each cacheline is associated with a dirty bit indicating whether it is a clean line or a dirty one. The dirty bit is set once the cacheline is written by the CPU. In writeback caches, the dirty cacheline is written back to the lower level caches upon replacement, as a single unit. Thus, it is very straightforward to perform data cache vulnerability analysis based on the cacheline lifetime information [8]. Applying our lifetime model, the data item here will be a cacheline. Obviously, the initial phase of all cachelines in the data cache is *Invalid*. Upon different CPU access activities, the cachelines enter different phases, i.e., *RR*, *RW*, *WW*, *WR*, *WRR*, *RPL*, *WPL*, or *WRPL*, at different time points.

We first analyze the impact of the cacheline size on the lifetime distribution and thus the vulnerability factor of the data array. Figure 2 shows the distribution of the cacheline lifetime under three cacheline sizes, namely 64, 32, and 16 bytes. For line-based lifetime analysis, previous research [8] considered only *WRR*, *RR*, *WR*, *WPL*, and *WRPL* (phase names here may be different from [8]) as vulnerable and all other phases as non-vulnerable. However, this is not accurate. As discussed early in Section III-A, the other two phases *RW* and *WW* have the potential to propagate errors to either the CPU side or the L2 caches. A scenario involving such an




Fig. 2. The lifetime distribution of the data array in the data cache with cacheline sizes of 64, 32, and 16 bytes.




Fig. 3. A scenario of cache accesses and error occurrences that contribute *RW* or *WW* to vulnerable phases.

error propagation to L2 caches is illustrated in Figure 3. If errors hit the clean bytes of a cacheline before a write updates other bytes, the error-corrupted clean bytes may also be written back to the L2 cache at a later replacement. However, if the erroneous clean bytes are overwritten by subsequent writes before CPU reads or a writeback operation to L2 caches, they present no harm to the correctness of program execution. Thus, we classify RW and WW as potential vulnerable phases.

Although the temporal vulnerability factor decreases as the cacheline size is reduced from 64 bytes to 16 bytes, as shown in Figure 2, the improvement is not significant. The TVF values for the data cache with 64-byte, 32-byte, and 16-byte cachelines are 39.2%, 37.3%, and 36.3%, respectively. Moreover, if we simply reduce the cacheline size, the performance normally degrades because of the spatial locality property. For the default line size (64 bytes), Figure 2 (a) shows that the vulnerable phases account for about 39.2% of a cacheline's lifetime, among which WPL and RR contribute about 19.3% and 9.3%, respectively. The two potential vulnerable phases RW and WW together account for 3.2%. The only truly non-vulnerable phases of the cacheline are RPL and Invalid. Note that Unknown represents a phase where the state cannot be determined because of the limited simulation time. RPL represents the largest part in the lifetime, around 54.3%, which is non-vulnerable. Therefore, to improve cache reliability, we should attempt to reduce the time spent by a cacheline in the WPL and RR phases.

2) Vulnerability Characterization at Fine Granularities:

Since the unit size for CPU data accesses is in the byte, a write operation does not update the entire cacheline. This characteristic of the data cache accesses makes different bytes in the same cacheline into different phases during the execution. For example, in a clean cacheline, if a byte write operation occurs, it will only update a particular byte in that cacheline and bring the entire cacheline to the dirty state. However, there is only one byte in the dirty state after the write, while others may still be in the clean state. Therefore, it is not accurate and efficient to assume that these clean bytes in a dirty cacheline are actually in the dirty state. Another problem with the line-based characterization is the inaccuracy in RW and WW profiling, as illustrated in Figure 3. For more accurate data cache vulnerability characterization, we perform lifetime analysis while scaling down the data item granularity to a word (8-byte) or a byte. Each data item can only be in one particular phase at a given time.

Figure 4 (a) and (b) show the lifetime distribution based on word-level and byte-level characterization. The TVF based on word-level characterization is 25.7%, compared to 39.2% for cacheline-level analysis. This TVF value is further reduced to 19.9% for byte-based characterization, as shown in Figure 4 (c). It is important to note that there is no potential vulnerable phase in the byte-based lifetime model. RW and WW are then true non-vulnerable phases as any error that occurred in a particular byte should be cleaned/overwritten by the subsequent write to the same byte. However, in the word-based lifetime model, RW and WW still contribute to potential vulnerable phases because of the same reason as for the cacheline based model. Table II summarizes the comparison of the results by




Fig. 4. The lifetime distribution of the data array in the data cache for fine granularity data items, word and byte.

using different granularities for vulnerability characterization.

D. The Impact of Different Cache Write Policies

1) *Write Through vs. Write Back*: From our cacheline based lifetime model, phase WPL alone contributes about 19.3% towards the 39.2% temporal vulnerability factor of the data array. A straightforward solution to reduce the WPL phase is to use a writethrough cache, where a write operation updates both L1 data cache and the L2 cache. In a writethrough cache, phase WPL is effectively converted to the non-vulnerable phase RPL.

However, besides reliability, performance and energy consumption are also key factors to consider in processor design. In general, the writethrough cache needs to update the L2 cache with every write to the L1 data cache. We performed a

TABLE II

THE COMPARISON OF VULNERABILITY CHARACTERIZATION AT DIFFERENT GRANULARITIES.

Granularity	Cacheline	Word	Byte
Vul. Phase	39.2%	25.7%	19.9%
Potential Vul.	3.2%	3.0%	0%





Fig. 5. (a) The comparison of IPCs between writethrough and writeback caches, and (b) the comparison of dynamic energy consumption in the L2 cache for writethrough and writeback data caches.

similar study as in [14][8]. Figure 5 (a) compares the performance of writethrough and writeback caches. We implement the writethrough cache with an 8-entry write buffer in order to alleviate the high pressure on the bandwidth and to reduce the write stalls. We find that for the simulated benchmarks, a writethrough cache incurs a performance loss of 3.8% as compared to a writeback data cache. Furthermore, Figure 5 (b) shows that the energy consumption in the L2 cache is more than doubled if the L1 data cache changes its policy from writeback to writethrough. Therefore, for applications that require high performance and low energy consumption, the writeback cache is still preferable.

2) *Multiple-Dirty-Bit (MDB) Data Cache*: From the results of line-based and byte-based vulnerability analysis, a major contributor to the TVF in a writeback cache is phase WPL. Based on the same idea as for the byte-level lifetime model, we find that if the clean bytes in a dirty cacheline are not written back to lower level caches during a replacement, any error occurring in clean bytes will be simply discarded. Thus,




Fig. 6. The energy savings in cache writeback when applying the MDB scheme at various granularities.

the WPL phase can be reduced as well as other vulnerable phases, as shown in Figure 4 (b). To achieve a similar TVF with the byte-level lifetime model, we propose a multi-dirty-bit (MDB) scheme.

In conventional data caches, there is only one dirty bit per cacheline, which prevents us from identifying whether a particular byte is dirty or not. In our MDB cache, we provide each byte with a dirty bit and update these dirty bits according to the read and write operations. For example, when the CPU writes an 8-byte word to the data cache, the 8 dirty bits associated with that word in a particular cacheline are set to one. When a dirty line is to be replaced, the dirty bits control which bytes should be written back to the L2 cache. Furthermore, by writing back only dirty bytes in a dirty cacheline, the cache energy consumption can be also reduced, due to reduced energy in data transfer bus and the L2 cache [37]. Notice that the dirty bit of a dirty byte is vulnerable, because if it flips to zero, the dirty byte will not be written back to the L2 cache at replacement time. However, the dirty bit of a clean byte is not vulnerable (when a single bit error is assumed), because if a soft error flips that dirty bit, it will only cause the clean byte to be written back.

Although the MDB scheme may incur an area overhead similar to that of providing a parity bit for each byte, our scheme has a negligible performance overhead. If the die area is highly constrained, we can relax the requirement by using a dirty bit per each word. As the comparison shown in Table II, the vulnerability factor is slightly increased to 25.7% if we associate one dirty bit for each word (8 bytes). On the other hand, the area overhead is reduced to one-eighth of the byte-level dirty bit scheme. Figure 6 also shows the energy savings of 50.6% and 32.5%, in the writeback when applying the byte-level and word-level MDB schemes, respectively.

3) *Dead Time based Early Write Back (DTEWB)*: Previous work [7][8] proposed early write back schemes to reduce the vulnerable WPL phase while avoiding a dramatic increase in the accesses to the L2 cache. Early write back schemes can be either LRU-based or dead time based [8]. A major design issue in the early write back scheme is to decide when to perform the writeback in order to reduce the WPL phase as well as the accesses to the L2 cache.




Fig. 7. (a) The comparison of dynamic energy consumption in the L2 cache at different dead times (b) WPL rates at different dead times.

The dead time based early write back (DTEWB) scheme [8] could be a solution. We conducted a study based on different dead times. Figure 7 (a) shows that the dynamic energy consumption in the L2 cache decreases when the dead time (the idle time interval for dead prediction) increases from 500 to 4K cycles, also comparing to writethrough and writeback caches without DTEWB scheme. Figure 7 (b) shows how different dead times affect the vulnerable WPL phase. From these two figures, DTEWB with 2K or 4K cycles can be good choices, which can dramatically reduce the vulnerable phase WPL to 0.8% or 1.4%, at an increase of the energy consumption of 59% or 37% in the L2 cache over the conventional writeback scheme. Notice that from our simulation results, the DTEWB scheme has a negligible performance overhead compared to the writeback cache.

E. Clean Cacheline Invalidation (CCI)

In the data array of the data cache, the RR phase, which is the time between two reads in a clean cacheline, contributes the second largest share to the vulnerability factor. This share becomes even dominant once the DTEWB scheme is employed, making the RR optimization of critical importance to achieving further improvement of TVF.


The basic idea for RR optimization is to reduce the time that a clean data item, i.e., a cacheline, resides in the data

cache by invalidating the cleanlines after being idle for some predefined intervals. Notice that if the clean cacheline is accessed subsequently, additional performance overhead incurs due to the additional cache misses as well as the energy overhead. However, if there is no subsequent access, this invalidation does not cause any performance loss and neither reduces the RR time. Thus, there is a clear tradeoff between the improved TVF and the performance degradation. The key is to locate such an idle interval for RR such that the RR time reduction can be maximized while the performance loss is minimized.


As shown in Figure 8 (a), we profiled the number of instances with two consecutive reads to the clean cachelines based on the time interval between the two reads. The figure shows the cumulative distribution and clearly indicates that most read-read instances, around 87.8% (or 93.1%) of them, have an interval less than 500 (or 1000) cycles. However, our results also show that a small number of read-read instances with intervals (≥ 1000 cycles) dominate the overall RR time, 84.5% on the average. The profile results convince us that a scheme capturing only long read-read instances should be able to substantially reduce RR time while keeping the performance loss to a minimum. Our experimental results in Figure 8 (b) and (c) show that 4K cycles is a good choice for this cacheline invalidation. The performance loss is only 0.7% and the RR phase is reduced from 9.3% to 2.6%.

F. Narrow Width Value Compression (NWVC)


We also observed that value awareness can be exploited for reliability enhancement [23][24]. Narrow-width as one form of value awareness has been exploited for energy and performance optimization [18][19][20][21][22][25][26][27][28]. In [23][24], narrow-width values are duplicated in the register file and the data cache thus improving their reliability with both error detection and recovery capabilities via information redundancy. Different from these duplication approaches, we explore lifetime model driven reliability optimization through narrow width value compression (NWVC), which is adopted from the narrow value identification schemes in [24]. NWVC uses additional narrow tag bits to mask leading zeros in a narrow width value. The narrow tag bit masking can be applied at different granularities, for each 8-bit (byte), 16-bit, 32-bit, or 64-bit (word) data item. For instance, byte-level masking sets the narrow tag bit to one if the corresponding byte contains all zeros. Otherwise, the tag bit is reset to zero. When the data in the cacheline is accessed, the narrow tag bits are checked. If the tag bit is one, it means that the corresponding byte contains all zeros. If any error occurred in this byte, it is simply masked off by the narrow tag bit. Therefore, all the bits in the zero byte are converted into a non-vulnerable state, leading to lower TVF. Moreover, the energy consumption in the data cache can be also reduced with NWVC schemes [38][39] since reading all-zero bytes can be avoided. Figure 9 shows the percentage of narrow width values in the L1 data cache at different granularities. For the byte-, 16-bit-, 32-bit-, and word-level narrow tag scheme, the percentage of narrow values is 43.8%, 37.0%, 25.5%, and 17.7% respectively, implying the



(a) RR distribution



(b) IPC



(c) RR rate

Fig. 8. (a) Cumulative distribution of the time intervals between two reads in clean cachelines, (b) the IPC comparison of different invalidation intervals, and (c) the RR phase comparison of different invalidation intervals. (ORG is the conventional data cache without the invalidation scheme.)

potential for TVF reduction at similar level. Notice that the narrow tag bit of a non-zero-item is vulnerable, because if it flips to one, the non-zero-item will be mistreated as zero. However, the narrow tag bit of a zero-item is non-vulnerable if a single bit error is assumed. This is because if the error occurs in this tag bit, the zero-item will be treated as a regular value that is still zero, and will not be affected by that single bit error.





Fig. 9. The percentage of narrow width values in active cachelines at different granularities.

TABLE III
OVERHEAD OF THE COMBINED SCHEME


Dirty tag bits for MDB (per line)	1 byte (per 64-byte)
Narrow tag bits for NWVC (per line)	1 byte (per 64-byte)
Interval Counters shared by DTEWB and CCI (per line)	2 bits (per 64-byte)
Total storage overhead	3.5% (18b/512b)
Performance loss	0.7%
Energy impact	negligible

G. The Combined Scheme

With the above schemes each targeting at a particular aspect in the lifetime model, we propose to evaluate the possibility and effectiveness of combining the DTEWB, MDB, CCI, and NWVC schemes in further improving the data array reliability, i.e., reducing the TVF of the data array. In our evaluation, we choose a 4K-cycle interval for both deadness prediction and cleanline invalidation. We use a similar implementation as in the cache decay scheme [17]. Each cacheline maintains a 2-bit local counter which is ticked every 1K cycles by a global counter. Both the dirty bit of the cacheline controls whether a simple invalidation or an early write back should be performed when the local counter saturates. Considering the hardware and energy overheads, we choose the word-level tag bits for both the MDB and NWVC schemes, which associate each 64-bit word with two tag bits. For the energy evaluation, all additional tag bits are included. Figure 10 presents the temporal vulnerability factor, performance and cache energy consumption for data caches with and without the combined scheme. By combining DTEWB, MDB, CCI and NWVC, we achieve a vulnerability factor as low as 3.5%, which significantly improves the data array reliability in the data cache, at a small performance loss of 0.7%. The total dynamic energy consumption in L1 data cache and L2 caches almost remains the same because of the energy saving from the MDB and NWVC schemes. Table III summarizes the overhead of our combined scheme.



(a) Performance (IPC)




(b) Temporal vulnerability factor (TVF)


Fig. 12. (a) The IPC comparison at different invalidation intervals, and (b) the TVF comparison at different invalidation intervals while applying the CCI scheme to the instruction cache. (ORG is the conventional instruction cache without CCI. CS-4K-CCI-16K is the combined scheme with 4K-cycle CS interval and 16K-cycle CCI interval.)

after it has been idle for a predefined time interval and incurs performance loss due to an extra cache miss if the line is to be reaccessed after the invalidation. To avoid this performance loss while still optimizing the TVF, we propose to consider cacheline scrubbing instead of invalidation, i.e., a cache miss is triggered to re-fetch the cacheline from the L2 cache. For this study, we assume that the L2 cache is protected by some means of ECC coding and therefore is error free. To minimize the performance overhead, the cache miss to re-fetch the cacheline can be scheduled during cache idle cycles. Notice that our scrubbing scheme is different from the schemes in [40][31][41] that scrub the data by recomputing the ECC codes to eliminate single bit errors based on a fixed scrubbing interval.

Figure 13 (a) shows the TVF of the instruction data array employing the CS scheme with different scrubbing intervals. With a 4K-cycle scrubbing interval, the TVF is reduced to 5.5%. If the scrubbing interval increases to a larger one, such as 32K cycles, the TVF also increases to 10.0%. Furthermore, if smaller intervals are chosen, there will be a huge increase in the number of accesses to the L2 cache. As shown in Figure 13 (b), the energy consumption in the L2 cache is 14.3 times that of the original one if the instruction cache scrubs with a 4K-cycle interval. Even if the interval increases to 32K cycles, the energy consumption in the L2 cache still becomes 1.4 times that of the original one. Once again, we are facing a



(a) Temporal vulnerability factor (TVF)



(b) L2 cache energy consumption increase rate (x times)

Fig. 13. (a) The TVF comparison at different scrubbing intervals, and (b) the comparison of the energy consumption increase rate in the L2 cache at different scrubbing intervals. (ORG is the conventional instruction cache without scrubbing. CS-4K-CCI-16K is the combined scheme with 4K-cycle CS interval and 16K-cycle CCI interval.)

reliability-energy tradeoff. Without a solution to this energy issue, cacheline scrubbing may not be acceptable in energy efficient designs.

D. The Combined (CS-CCI) Scheme

Clean cacheline invalidation (CCI) benefits the most from capturing large RRs, while cacheline scrubbing (CS) optimizes relatively small RRs with negligible performance impact. To exploit the strength of both CCI and CS, we propose to explore combining CCI and CS for TVF optimization in the instruction cache. In the proposed combined scheme, we first scrub an idle cacheline after a small time interval. If the cacheline continues to be idle for a long interval, we invalidate it in order to prevent further (unnecessary) scrubbing. From our simulation results, we choose a 4K-cycle interval for CS and a 16K-cycle interval for CCI. The results in Figure 12 (b) show that the TVF of the CS-4K-CCI-16K combined scheme is 5.3% compared to the 8.0% of the CCI-16K scheme. Further, the performance of the CS-4K-CCI-16K scheme is almost the same as for the CCI-16K scheme, which is within 0.9% of the original scheme. Figure 13 (b) shows that the L2 cache energy consumption of the CS-4K-CCI-16K scheme is about 1.29 times of that for the original scheme, as compared to the 14.3 times for the CS-4K only scheme.

V. TVF CHARACTERIZATION OF TAG ARRAYS

A. Tag Array of the Data Cache

1) *Lifetime of the Tag Array*: The lifetime model of the tag array is quite different from that of the data array. This is because of the unique access pattern in the tag array. In the data array, if a clean cacheline is to be replaced, it is simply discarded, which makes the RPL time non-vulnerable. However, the RPL time of the tag array is still vulnerable. For example, during an access to a set-associative cache, all tags of different ways in the mapped set need to be read out and compared with the address tag field simultaneously. If one tag matches, the current access hits the cache. Otherwise, a cache miss is signaled. Thus, before a cacheline is selected as the candidate for replacement during a cache miss, its tag has been compared and the result is an unmatched. Now if there are errors in the tag, it is possible to cause a false match on this cache access. Furthermore, there is no update operation on the tag. Thus, the non-vulnerable phases RW and WW in the data array are not suitable for the tag array.

2) *False Hit and False Miss*: If errors occur in the tag array, it may cause erroneous cache hits or misses. However, false hit and false miss have different impacts on TVF characterization. A false hit happens when a tag struck by soft errors matches the tag field of the address, which was supposed to be a cache miss. On the other hand, a false miss happens when an error affected tag does not match the coming address tag, which should be a cache hit. A false hit will cause an incorrect execution by loading data from or updating a wrong cacheline. However, a false miss causes an additional cache miss and thus incurs performance loss. Its impact on TVF depends on whether it is in a clean line or a dirty line, since a false miss in a dirty cacheline will load stale data from the L2 cache. In a writeback cache, if the tag of a dirty cacheline is flipped by soft errors, the cacheline will be written back to a wrong location in the L2 cache, which is likely to cause an erroneous output.

3) *Lifetime Model Based on the Extended Hamming-Distance-One (HDO) Analysis*: If a single-bit error is assumed, the false hit will happen only when the tag has one single bit different from the incoming address tag and this particular bit is flipped by the soft error. We utilize the Hamming-distance-one analysis [31] to track false hits and further extend this HDO analysis method to characterize the TVF of the tag array. Notice that if a tag entry (its original value) matches an incoming address tag, any bit flipped by a soft error will cause a false miss. For tag entries with multiple bits different from the incoming tag, no false hit or false miss will happen. Furthermore, only the single different bit in the HDO tag entry is vulnerable for a clean cacheline. However, in a writeback cache, all bits in the tag entry of a dirty cacheline are vulnerable since either a false hit or a false miss will load erroneous data or corrupt the L2 cache.

Based on extended HDO analysis, we propose to divide the lifetime of the tag array in a writeback cache into six phases: RH, FWPL, RHFw, HFw, HPL, and Invalid.

- RH: lifetime phase between the first read and the last Hamming-distance-one (HDO) match of a clean cache-




Fig. 14. The tag lifetime of a cacheline in the writeback cache.



line,

- FWPL: lifetime phase between the first write and the replacement of a dirty cacheline,
- RHFw: lifetime phase between the first read and the last HDO match before the first write of a dirty cacheline,
- HFw: lifetime phase between the last HDO match and the first write of a dirty cacheline,
- HPL: lifetime phase between the last HDO match and the replacement of a clean cacheline,
- Invalid: lifetime phase in the invalid state.


Figure 14 shows the correlation among the lifetime phases for typical tag activities. The RH, FWPL, and RHFw phases are vulnerable because errors occurring in the RH and RHFw phases will cause false hits, and errors occurring in the FWPL phase will cause incorrect writebacks to the L2 cache or erroneous data load. Phases HFw, HPL, and Invalid are non-vulnerable because errors occurring in the HFw phase will only cause a false miss on the first write in a clean cacheline, and errors occurring in the HPL phase will be discarded at replacement. Figure 15 (a) shows the phase distribution of the tag entry in a writeback data cache. About 14.4% of the tag entry lifetime is in the RH phase. The FWPL phase contributes about 31.7%. Phases RHFw and HFw together account for 0.47%. Consequently, the TVF of the tag array is around 46.7%.

However, to improve the accuracy, TVF characterization based on the extended HDO analysis needs to be performed at the bit level. The bit-level analysis results in Figure 15 (b) show that the RH vulnerable phase is reduced to 0.76% from 14.4% in the entry-level analysis (as shown in Figure 15 (a)). Figure 15 (c) summarizes this comparison between entry-level and bit-level phase distributions, an average for all benchmarks. Notice that the FWPL vulnerable phase remains the same because all the bits in the FWPL phase are vulnerable. In the following study, we use the bit-level analysis for TVF characterization.

In a writethrough cache, the FWPL phase is eliminated. The lifetime of read-only cachelines in writethrough caches is similar to that of the clean lines in writeback caches. However, the lifetime of cachelines with write operations in the writethrough cache is quite different from that of the dirty lines in the writeback cache. In order to illustrate



Entry-Level Phase Distribution Bit-Level Phase Distribution



(c) An average for both entry level and bit level

Fig. 15. The lifetime distribution for the tag array in the writeback data cache at different granularities: entry level and bit level.

this difference, we compare the TVF of the cachelines with write operations in both the writethrough and writeback data caches. Figure 16 shows that the TVF of the cachelines with write operations in the writethrough cache is only 0.4%, as compared to 31.7% for the writeback cache.

4) *The Impact of DTEWB and CCI on the TVF of the Data Cache Tag Array:* The DTEWB and CCI schemes in the data array also help reduce the TVF of the tag array. The DTEWB scheme will reduce the FWPL phase of a tag entry in a writeback cache, while the CCI scheme will reduce the RH phase. In order to be consistent with the data array, we use the same 4K-cycle interval for both DTEWB and CCI in the tag array study. Figure 16 shows that the DTEWB scheme reduces the dirty line tag FWPL to 7.7% and Figure 17 shows that the CCI scheme reduces the RH rate of the clean line tags




Fig. 16. The FWPL rate comparison for the tag array in writeback (WB), writethrough (WT), and DTEWB caches.




Fig. 17. The RH rate comparison between the original and CCI schemes in the data cache.

to 0.02%.

B. Tag Array of the Instruction Cache

The lifetime of the tag array in an instruction cache has only three phases: RH, HPL, and Invalid, among which only the RH phase contributes to TVF. Figure 18 shows that the TVF of the tag array in the instruction cache is only about 0.3%. Among the TVF reduction schemes for the data array of the instruction cache, the CCI scheme can also help reduce the TVF of the tag array. However, the CS scheme does not have any noticeable improvement on TVF. Therefore, we only consider the CCI scheme and conduct a study on the CCI with the same 16K-cycle invalidation interval as in the combined scheme for the data array. The results in Figure 18 show that the CCI scheme reduces the tag array TVF to only 0.08%.

VI. CONCLUSIONS

In this paper, we performed a detailed study on the cache vulnerability to soft errors based on new lifetime models of data and tag arrays in both the data and instruction caches. This study identified major contributors (vulnerable phases) to the cache vulnerability. It aims to provide insights into cache vulnerability behavior as well as guidance in designing highly cost-effective reliable caches. Driven by the results from

TABLE V
COMPARISON OF ALL PROPOSED SCHEMES

Scheme	Description
DTEWB	Reducing the WPL and FWPL vulnerable phases of the data and tag arrays in the writeback data cache, while minimizing the performance and energy overheads as compared to the writethrough cache.
MDB	Reducing the vulnerable phases (mainly WPL) of the data array in the data cache by preventing writing back clean data items to the L2 cache. Additional dirty tag bits are needed (1/64 storage overhead for the word-level tag).
CCI	Reducing the RR and RH vulnerable phases of the data and tag arrays in both the data and instruction caches. However, for the instruction cache, the reduction effect comes at the cost of high performance loss.
NWVC	Reducing all vulnerable phases by exploiting the narrow width values in the data array in the data cache. Additional narrow tag bits are needed (1/64 storage overhead for the word-level tag).
CS	Reducing the RR vulnerable phase of the data array in the instruction cache. However, the reduction effect comes at the cost of high energy consumption.
Combined	Reducing the overall vulnerable phases in the data cache with minimized performance and energy overheads by combining the DTEWB, MDB, CCI, and NWVC schemes (word-level tag bits for both MDB and NWVC, 4K-cycle intervals for both DTEWB and CCI).
CS-CCI	Reducing overall vulnerable phases in the instruction cache with minimized performance and energy overheads by combining the CS and CCI schemes (a 4K-cycle interval for CS and a 16K-cycle interval for CCI).




Fig. 18. The RH rate comparison between the original and CCI schemes for the tag array in the instruction cache.

TABLE IV
SUMMARY OF TARGETING VULNERABLE PHASES OF ALL PROPOSED SCHEMES.

Scheme	Data Cache		Instruction Cache	
	Data Array	Tag Array	Data Array	Tag Array
DTEWB	WPL	FWPL	-	-
MDB	WPL	-	-	-
CCI	RR	RH	RR	RH
NWVC	Overall	-	-	-
CS	-	-	RR	-
Combined	Overall	Overall	-	-
CS-CCI	-	-	RR	RR

our temporal vulnerability factor (TVF) characterization, we proposed reliability schemes targeting at specific vulnerable phases, which are summarized in Table IV and V. First, we studied the impact of different data cache write policies, early write back schemes and the proposed multiple-dirty-bit (MDB) scheme on reducing the vulnerable WPL phase of dirty cachelines. We proposed a clean cacheline invalidation (CCI) scheme to reduce the time when clean cachelines stay in the vulnerable RR phase and studied the narrow-width value compression (NWVC) scheme in reducing the overall vulnerable phases. By combining the DTEWB, MDB, CCI, and NWVC schemes, the data array in the data cache attains a substantially improved reliability. For the data array in an instruction cache,

we proposed a variation of the cacheline scrubbing (CS) scheme to reduce its vulnerable phase. Combined with the CCI scheme, the CS-CCI scheme achieves a lower TVF with the minimized performance and energy overheads. We also developed a new lifetime model for the tag array based on extended Hamming-distance-one (HDO) analysis. Our results with HDO analysis indicate that the tag array has a potentially low TVF, except the writeback data cache, and the DTEWB and CCI schemes can substantially improve the reliability of the tag arrays in the cache.

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