Technological innovations in security and privacy are critical to advancing modern computing in our time. I will present the initial steps of an ongoing effort involving deployment of experimental commercial applications designed and built as a 'secure multi-party computation protocol for specific tasks,' to be used repetitively to achieve a number of concrete ubiquitous business goals. In these applications, the outputs are calculated in the presence of privacy constraints which prevent parties from sharing their individual inputs directly and openly. I will also discuss what I think are the reasons for the inherent difficulty of developing such routines in general (for achieving business goals). In particular, I will survey what I believe to be the reasons that 40 years since the notion of secure computation protocols was invented as a basic theoretical idea, capturing specific and then general computational tasks, and in spite of its theoretical and even recent experimentation success, the notion has not yet been widely and seriously used in achieving routine relevant business goals (in contrast with symmetric key and public key cryptosystems and protocols). The presentation will also cover the general bottom up methodology used in this concrete industrial effort leading to the design and development process.