NEW JERSEY BUSINESS FORCE – OPERATION PANDORA’S JAR

POST-EXERCISE REPORT

I. Introduction

This report is written in a lessons-learned style and documents the observations, responses and recommendations culled from three separate segments of exercise play. Publishing a detailed exercise analysis contributes to the dialogue on Public-Private Partnerships and can validate emerging strategies for protecting the state, region and nation. Operation PANDORA’S JAR was divided into three phases consisting of four modules to determine how government agencies can better coordinate and partner with the Private Sector during a major bio-terror incident within New Jersey. Capturing player ideas and interactions is absolutely essential for building new homeland security constructs.

Module 1

A three-day intelligence build-up marked the first phase of Operation PANDORA’S JAR. The NJBF/NC4 Information Share system was used to communicate alerts, incidents and warnings from December 1-3. NJBF companies received a total of 17 exercise injects in Module 1. This activity depicted increases in activity often seen prior to a terrorist event. Designated principals received alert notifications and logged onto the NC4 Website to review exercise injects and messages.

Modules 2 & 3

Representatives from 14 NJBF companies and BENS-National Business Force assembled at the New Jersey Network Building, Trenton, on December 6, 2004, for the exercise’s second phase - a facilitated tabletop. A tabletop exercise is a facilitated analysis of a simulated emergency. Activities are scenario driven and help players identify what planning documents need modification and updating. Tabletops also stimulate innovative thought and problem solving.

Modules 2 and 3 challenged players with a rapidly expanding bio-terrorism event. The demands of the exercise scenario grew increasingly complex in scale and culminated in a New Jersey State Declaration of Emergency and, later, a Presidential Disaster Declaration.

Private Sector companies faced two onerous problems during tabletop play: (1) How to maintain business operations while absenteeism among workers climbed; and (2) Could companies respond to the state’s request for assistance during the crisis? The facilitator for the tabletop exercise, New Jersey State Police Sergeant Mike Small from the State Domestic Preparedness Exercise Unit, skillfully applied the Socratic Method to elicit substantive comments and insights.

Module 4

The third and final segment was a post-tabletop activity focused on Private Sector emergency and continuity plans. The situation in Module 4 presented the Private Sector with the dilemma of a major bio-terror event compounded by unintended consequences resulting from government decisions made in the midst of a full-blown emergency. During module four, NJBF players received six questions to answer through E-mail.

The questions addressed (1) the potential implications of governmental decisions on long-term business continuity and recovery and, (2) Private Sector response following a covert bio-terror attack. Participants
had to reflect back on the concepts and ideas raised during exercise play and assess the challenges of terrorist threats on current Private Sector business continuity and recovery plans.

**Module 4 Questions**

1. What type of information is crucial to sustain business continuity operations before, during and following a bio-terror attack?

2. How would *you* and your company respond to a New Jersey Office of Emergency Management request for assistance during the bio-terror emergency depicted in the scenario? What limiting factors must be taken into consideration when supporting such requests?

3. How does the elevation of the Threat Advisory Level to Red potentially affect your company’s operation?

4. What impact does the U. S. Secretary of Transportation’s directive to temporarily close the state’s airports and rail stations have on your company and workforce?

5. What are the potential implications for the Private Sector of enhanced and evolving homeland security programs?

6. In general, should your company’s philosophy and/or orientation underlying business continuity and incident response and recovery planning be adjusted/modified to address 21st Century terrorist threats – Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN)?

* You – The use of “you” in the context of Module 4 is applicable to (1) the exercise participant, (2) company, (3) company employees, or (4) company operations.

PANDORA’S JAR examined the efficacy and flow of internal/external communications, emergency and business continuity planning, requirements for expedient decision-making, and the integration of key Private Sector resources into state emergency management protocols. Each exercise phase demonstrated just how critical Private Sector access to timely, accurate and actionable information is for effective Private Sector emergency preparedness and viable Public-Private response.

**Overarching Exercise Goal**

The December 6th New Jersey Business Force tabletop exercise had four overarching goals and three primary objectives:

**Agency and Sector Interface:** Determine how Private Sector companies can interface with state and local agencies prior to, during and following a catastrophic bio-terrorism event. Also, identify to what degree organizational culture influences interagency communication and collaboration.

**Emergency Planning and Preparation:** Assess the suitability of current Private Sector emergency plans, policies and procedures for the extraordinary challenges posed by large-scale bio-terrorism events.

**Alert Warning/Emergency Communications:** Examine how the NC4 Info Share, NJN Digital Secure as well as other available communication systems can facilitate the integration of private sector resources into the state’s emergency management architecture and provide advance indicators/warnings of potential threats.
Resource Management: Examine strategies for fully integrating Private Sector capabilities into local, state and/or regional emergency plans and procedures.

Exercise Objectives

A. Communications/Information Sharing:
1. Assess the capacity of NJBF information sharing systems to transmit timely and relevant information.
2. Identify the type of information Government agencies should share with the Private Sector to enhance homeland security efforts.
3. Determine how NJBF members respond and react to information received through NJBF information sharing systems and from state agencies.

B. Business Continuity
1. Identify how NJBF members track and report anomalous rates of absenteeism among their workforces.
2. Explain the measures companies could employ to protect facilities and employees during and following a bio-terror event.

C. Mobilization of Private Sector Resources
1. Identify the assets and key resources NJBF members could contribute toward a New Jersey response during a bio-terror event.
2. Demonstrate how the private sector can be integrated into a local/state response during a bio-terror event.

II. Analysis

Module 1: Intelligence Build-Up

The exercise’s initial phase was designed to replicate the increase in raw information often seen prior to a major terrorist event. This may not always be the case in the future since the adversary’s tactics and leadership frequently change.

Module 1 demonstrated how companies monitor and analyze news from around the world. Separating truly significant information from the less relevant is a formidable task analysts face. For the Private Sector, timely, accurate, actionable, and relevant information becomes the gold standard in their efforts to protect employees, facilities and ensure the viability of key resources and skilled personnel for post-event recovery.

The flow of event and intelligence injects began on December 1st and ended late on December 3rd. Exercise information was transmitted to designated participants over the NJBF/NC4 Information Share System. The Information Share System gave NJBF companies an ability to communicate assessments and preparatory measures among themselves. Time compression created a somewhat artificial surge in tempo but did not diminish the experience of evaluating diverse intelligence and news reports.

a. Information Requirements – During the tabletop exercise (TTX), New Jersey Business Force members repeatedly identified the need for timely and actionable information – and lots of it. Global business depends on extensive internal networks for a steady stream of information to service their domestic and international markets and sites.
An incident far removed from New Jersey still carries major implications for the Private Sector as the TTX demonstrated. Companies often interact with intelligence sources outside of New Jersey and, if necessary, have the means to loop back information generated this way. Once received, information is often channeled to different internal branches, departments and functional areas. In many cases, larger corporations analyze raw data for the purposes of threat analysis and critical decision-making.

Participation in the global marketplace has instilled in the Private Sector sensitivity for unfolding events in other regions of the world. The Private Sector confronts two important 21st Century dynamics: (1) catastrophic disasters/emergencies have considerable potential to be crosscutting events; and (2) companies operate within a global communications grid and system. The breadth and frequency of Private Sector information requirements are quite substantial.

b. Private Sector Preparedness – The NJBF TTX revealed how current, accurate, timely, and actionable information underlies current business preparedness planning. Thwarting terrorist intentions is a race against time. Too much information can overwhelm decision makers; thus having a manageable number of trusted sources is important during an emergency.

Early warning through internal networks - NJBF/NC4 Information Share, NJN Data Secure, NJ Office of Counter-Terrorism bulletins, agency websites or a combination of systems - can properly orient the Private Sector at the outset of an incident whether the activity involves risk assessment, prevention or protection. Assuming the appropriate posture based on the most reliable information available should keep companies ahead of breaking events while positioning themselves to assist civil authorities if requested.

The NJBF TTX brought out the cost of preparation: emotion, dollars, resources and time. Being constantly placed in a reactive posture increases expenditures and affects decision-making. TTX play illustrated the complexities of Private Sector response and the lead-time necessary to fully implement crisis related decisions. NJBF companies have established plans, policies and procedures to insure uninterrupted operations and, if disrupted, return to a state of normality as soon as possible. Throughout the exercise, participants reiterated the importance of communication, planning, training, exercising, and education.

c. Internal Communications – The TTX highlighted two-way information sharing as a main pillar of Public-Private Partnerships. The Private Sector closely watches situations both at home and overseas. An infectious disease outbreak such as SARS could ultimately affect personnel assignments, international operations and travel. “Blips” or changes in security levels trigger immediate actions in accordance with company protocols. Specifically, the TTX showed how companies share information formally and informally among one another.

In Module 1, several companies posted comments on the NJBF/NC4 Information Share System in response to exercise injects. Because the Private Sector continually monitors the environment around its facilities, companies are privy to and can generate their own raw intelligence.

Integrating the Private Sector into a state response involves collaboration, joint planning and two-way communication. A wealth of expertise resides in the Private Sector. Furthermore, security is a core competency for many Private Sector companies.

The TTX revealed the Private Sector’s willingness to lend the Public Sector its “brain matter” and expertise. According to one viewpoint, this resource has yet to be fully exploited. Doing so means bringing companies early into “the process” whether it is planning, training or exercising.
Several companies mentioned the mutually beneficial relationships they have built with local OEMs. These partnerships could be expanded even further. Associations forged from joint training and exercising can help identify the touch points for releasing pre-approved Private Sector assets during state emergencies.

d. External Communications - Two-way communication creates a feedback loop where the Public Sector can benefit from the early detection capabilities companies possess. Including the Private Sector in local and state exercises - live, distributive and virtual – can serve as a catalyst for achieving synergy based on cooperative partnerships. Conversely, the Private Sector could leverage these opportunities to identify and refine its potential contributions without adversely degrading business continuity. Any attempt to create a unity of effort must transcend organizational culture and limit the reliance on institutional jargon and terminology.

e. Finding 1-1 - Early alert and warning improved the ability of Private Sector companies to protect personnel and facilities and better position themselves to assist and support a state response. New Jersey Business Force companies displayed a willingness to collaborate and share threat and preventative measures among one another.

f. Finding 1-2 - Being part of the solution means much more than simply integrating Private Sector assets into state and local response plans.

g. Finding 1-3 - Access to information throughout each stage of a crisis is a prerequisite for effective business continuity, response and recovery plan execution vis-à-vis crisis management operations.

Module 2 - NJBF Tabletop Exercise

The first indicators of a bio-terror attack appeared in the Module 2 scenario with normal, healthy people presenting themselves in growing numbers at hospital emergency rooms in the Atlantic City and Hackensack areas.

a. While the growing incidence of illness within the vignette appeared restricted to two urban areas, NJBF players explained how the incident would launch a review of various internal measures. Company medical departments would monitor the workforce for symptoms. Employee awareness and education also assumed more emphasis as situational awareness increased.

b. Situational information was seen as an underlying requirement to address “customer” concerns and inquiries during all phases of the crisis – another aspect of business continuity. A crisis does not obviate the need for the Private Sector to interact with customers or provide some level of production or services.

c. Infrastructure hardening is only one aspect of Private Sector preparation. Another is the impact managerial decisions have on the workforce during an emergency. The Private Sector pre-attack preparations raised at the TTX included enhanced physical security, plan implementation and situational assessment based on the threat. During a biological event, employees would receive training on physiological symptoms and appropriate personal protective measures.

d. Providing employees with accurate and timely information may possibly reduce the anticipated demand for acute mental health care, control rumors and allay concern generated by the extreme uncertainty produced by a catastrophic attack especially one employing chemical and biological a
The silent, delayed effects of a bio-attack carry with it a tremendous potential for panic if not managed properly. The comments of NJBF companies during the tabletop repeatedly illustrated the criticality and necessity of maintaining contact with government agencies throughout an event. Once the full magnitude of the bio-attack was realized, several NJBF participants weighed the alternative of shifting work to other locations outside of New Jersey.

e. Several companies discussed the specialized training their managers receive. Managers either individually or as part of a crisis/emergency action team will be called upon to determine how events of severe magnitude may place employees in direct or indirect danger. Subsequent decisions made amidst a backdrop of confusion can touch every aspect of a business operation: (1) Does one shelter the workforce in-place for safety reasons? (2) Should employees remain at home to tele-commute? (3) When can essential workers be safely recalled? (4) Can business operations be shifted to another site/work center? (5) How long can loss of revenue be sustained? The information managers need to make important and time-sensitive decisions rests to a large degree on effective interaction between the Private and Public Sectors. During a bio-event, companies will want to step up their contacts with civil authorities.

f. Tabletop participants identified a variety measures the Private Sector can adopt to protect employees, their families and communities during bio-events or outbreaks of natural occurring diseases. A compilation of actions follows:

1. Track and record sudden anomalous attendance rates occurring among the workforce.
2. Collaborate with local, county and state health authorities.
3. Mobilize in-house crisis action or emergency action teams.
4. Develop and disseminate infectious disease protocols.
5. Publicize protective measures through education and training materials.
6. Ensure employees receive medications and vaccines supplied by local and county health agencies.
7. Make Private Sector facilities available as Strategic National Stockpile Points of Distribution (POD) for prophylaxis of employees and the public.
8. Shelter in-house if the releasing of employees jeopardizes their health and safety.
9. Establish telephone hotlines and special information pages on company websites.
10. Implement work-at-home policies for sick employees.
11. Arrange with local health departments emergency prophylaxis for essential employees.

g. Finding 2-1 - Private Sector liaison with public health agencies during a bio-event contributes to increased situational awareness and can provide useful demographic data to state agencies conducting epidemiological surveys.

h. Finding 2-2 - Coping with the specter of bio-terrorism may require an employee training curriculum covering such topics as biological agent awareness, their physiological effects and universal protective measures.

i. Finding 2-3 - Disruption of critical business operations due to government decisions carry the potential for serious economic consequences at both micro and macro levels.

**Module 3 – NJBF Tabletop Exercise**

Suspicions of a bio-attack are confirmed in Module 3 and a statewide Declaration of Emergency is declared within New Jersey. Cases similar to those witnessed during the initial outbreak begin to appear outside the affected areas for the first time.
a. Possible actions companies would take in response to the developments depicted in the scenario include:

1. Implement the appropriate emergency plans/WMD response plans.
2. Companies who normally provide the state Emergency Operations Center with staff would dispatch representatives if required.
3. NJN would shift to a 24/7 emergency broadcast capability.
   (1) The Digital Secure system would become operational upon NJOEM activation for the crisis.
   (2) When updates are available provide “crawl” reports along with live news cut-ins.
4. Initiate assessments of risk to determine the type of threat facilities and employees face.
5. Recall managers and supervisors when confronted with significant workforce absenteeism.
6. Bring workers with critical skills in from out-of-state to maintain business operations during periods of high absenteeism, environmental conditions permitting.
7. If the capability exists, shift operations to automated systems supplemented by critical staff as a short-term measure.
8. Track vendor deliveries during public health emergencies to determine their source of origination – a contamination avoidance measure.
9. Provide event information and educational materials whenever possible to increase employee awareness and address concerns.

b. Discussion surrounding the exercise scenario identified unintended consequences stemming from governmental decisions to close roads, airports, schools, etc. NJBF exercise participants described some of these potential impacts as:

1. Loss of income/revenue due to the effect of policy decisions on business operations.
2. Governmental emergency actions may heighten concerns and fears among employees.
3. In order to implement telecommuting programs during a crisis, information technology and computer systems must function properly. A large numbers of workers attempting to access company servers over an extended period presents significant IT challenges.
4. Critical/essential employees may require accommodations locally during imposed travel bans.
5. Travel restrictions will likely further reduce the available workforce already affected by the dispersal of a biological pathogen.
6. The very nature of an event may prevent the release of employees from company facilities; thereby, necessitating the stockpiling of provisions for a specified duration.
7. Employee concern for family safety may exacerbate sheltering in-place or work-at-home programs.

c. A poignant question directed to the company representatives dealt with the Private Sector’s ability to voluntarily support NJOEM if the expanding situation required additional or specialized resources. Their replies represented the unique but diverse capabilities resident in the Private Sector. A case in point is NJN. NJN provides direct support to the New Jersey Emergency Operations Center and broadcasts public service messages during emergencies. Three other NJBF companies are actively exploring the possibility of opening their facilities to county public health as Points of Distribution (PODs) for mass prophylaxis/vaccinations. Another would request mutual assistance from the utilities industry or seek out-of-state assets if they found their own capacity diminished by the emergency. NJBF companies would willingly lend equipment and assistance for priority requests within the constraints of limited manpower.
d. The question, “What happens if the resources you commit to a state response become depleted?” highlighted the differences among companies in terms of capacities and capabilities. In some instances, when assets and materials are consumed/expended, there is no reserve or stockpile available; when they are gone, they’re gone. Other companies have national access to equipment and materials because of the critical services they perform. Finally, a third course of action discussed was the use of contracts and cash purchases to replenish resources.

e. The dialogue generated during Module 3 offered insight into Private Sector motivations: a desire to be solution oriented; a genuine concern for the safety and welfare for their employees, their families and the communities in which they live; and a sincere sense of civic responsibilities to community, state and nation.

f. **Finding 3-1** - Private Sector companies bring significant capability to the table through intellectual capital, talented and skilled workforces, fiscal and material resources, and a genuine commitment to defend the homeland against attack.

g. **Finding 3-2** - For the Private Sector to be fully integrated into a local or state response, two-way communication must take place at the outset of an event. Each organization has a unique set of information requirements. Those belonging to the Private Sector are more extensive than may have been originally thought.

h. **Finding 3-3** - Sweeping government decisions made during an emergency and in the absence of Private Sector input, especially prior to an event, could carry significant unintended consequences.

**Module 4 - Response and Recovery**

Operation PANDORA’S JAR concluded with Module 4. The six questions forwarded to each tabletop participant on December 13th asked for commentary about prospective long-term response/recovery issues and the implications of government decisions made in response to the burgeoning crisis. The narratives below are compilations and summations of the responses submitted by the exercise participants.

**Module 4 Scenario Summary**

More than seven days transpired since the first patients presented themselves at the state’s hospital emergency rooms. New Jersey experiences severe economic and social repercussions as the health emergency worsens. Both the state and Federal government issue emergency declarations in an attempt to contain and mitigate the crisis.

**Module 4 Questions**

**Question 1** - What type of information is crucial to sustain business continuity operations before, during and following a bio-terror attack?

NJBF companies identified information requirements for both pre-attack and trans-attack stages. Respondents indicated a need for education and information about potential biological agents before an incident occurs. Once an attack is detected, pivotal decisions must be made regarding the closing of facilities, risking employee exposure to potential hazards, transferring work out of New Jersey, servicing of customers, etc.
When an attack does take place, the information received must be timely, reliable and depict the full tactical picture. To gauge an event’s impact on business operations, Private Sector leaders will be looking for Public Sector guidance on the type of agent employed and its characteristics, the anticipated duration of attack, areas affected, method of dispersal, concentration of agent used, associated health risks if exposed, symptoms, health and treatment protocols, protective measures, contamination avoidance procedures, emergency advisories/declarations issued by civil authorities, travel restrictions, impact of the event on critical services and infrastructure, and available information cleared for release to employees and public. Companies could also supply state agencies with data on worker absenteeism, symptoms and disabilities. This type of information could be useful for early event detection and epidemiological surveys.

**Question 2** – How would you and your company respond to a New Jersey Office of Emergency Management request for assistance during the bio-terror emergency depicted in the scenario? What limiting factors must be taken into consideration when supporting such requests?

Internal plans, protocols and memorandums of understanding presently dictate the extent of assistance and assets NJBF companies lend to a state response. Several NJBF companies dispatch representatives to the NJ Emergency Operations Center when activated. For companies who provide essential services, e.g., telecommunications or utilities, situational awareness is paramount. Naturally, business continuity and facility protection are top priorities.

Companies must continually review the status of personnel and resources during an emergency. Employees are generally not trained or equipped to respond to a bio-terror emergency. Collectively companies can draw upon a range of specialized capabilities: medical teams, volunteers for POD operations, health specialists, and technical experts spanning multiple disciplines. The NJBF Business Response Network catalogs what member companies have pre-identified for disaster response assistance. In some instances, products like medical supplies and pharmaceuticals could address shortages or replenish exhausted state inventories. Internal requirements would ultimately determine what resources can be dedicated for a state response. Still, others are exploring the possibility of making facilities available as Points of Distribution for mass prophylaxis of the public. Health and safety of employees, security and liability issues are factors limiting the use of Private Sector locations as PODs. Resolving these issues in advance and codify terms in formal agreements ensures unity of effort.

**Question 3** – How does the elevation of the Threat Advisory Level to RED potentially affect your company’s operation?

Level Red triggers extensive internal security precautions, controls for accessing facilities and governs the receipt of deliveries/shipments. Additional actions tied to a Red Level Advisory include increased security patrols, activation of specialized teams and control centers, implementation of robust security measures, evaluation of business operating procedures, close coordination with law enforcement, possible evacuation of non-essential personnel, shut down of impacted facilities, reliance on work-at-home programs, imposition of travel restrictions, isolation/safeguarding HVAC systems, enacting in-place sheltering, increased employee education, and assessing the impact of long-term business disruptions. Unrestricted internal and external communications flow is vital keep top-level decision makers informed and responsive to sudden developments and changes in circumstance.

Generally speaking, the Private Sector cannot sustain critical business operations under an extended Level Red Advisory. Attempts to do so may place physical and emotional burdens on essential employees and managers. Business costs will likely rise as well. Elevated security is expensive in its own right, degrades productivity and service output and affects long-term commercial transactions. Reducing business
operations lowers revenue. Shut down an entire commercial enterprise for longer than a brief duration, then mounting economic losses could jeopardize a company’s very survival.

**Question 4 –** What impact does the U.S. Secretary of Transportation’s directive to temporarily close the state’s airports and rail stations have on your company and workforce?

Larger companies will likely absorb the fallout from a short-term shut down of the state’s transportation hubs. People traveling to New Jersey on business can be routed to out-of-state airports and stations and then motor transported to their ultimate destination. For commuters, viable options are car pooling, buses, or tele-commuting. However, deviation from the norm carries a cost. Private Sector revenues will suffer to a lesser degree from disruptions involving days. Moreover, significant workforce absenteeism will further reduce productivity.

Circumstances aside, for companies with corporate operations in New York City, rail and subway stations closures in New Jersey creates additional headaches and potential impediments to restoring business operations to pre-event levels. Similarly, air cargo would be diverted, re-routed or delayed as well. The Private Sector will encounter increasing economic pressures and stresses the longer an event runs. Again, each added accommodation and delivery slippage carries a price.

The severity of a localized incident can quickly escalate to international proportions due to the complexities of global economic interdependence. Confronted with the prospect of substantial loss, New Jersey companies may be forced to send work elsewhere until the event is fully mitigated. Air and rail restrictions are logistical in nature and undoubtedly a solution will be found relatively quick. Conversely, the closures detailed in the scenario and the attendant reasons for such drastic actions also have psychological ramifications. Several NJBF members linked extreme measures with loss of workforce morale. Anxiety is a second order effect and can degrade work flow if not properly managed. The inability to re-establish a sense of normality can distract employees from their jobs.

**Question 5 –** What are the potential implications for the Private Sector of enhanced and evolving homeland security programs?

Prior to the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the Private Sector devoted limited assets and planning efforts to homeland security programs. Today, the Private Sector understands the serious threats 21st Century terrorists personify. The Private Sector continues to evaluate new homeland security initiatives and is adopting those most applicable to their situation. Heightened vigilance and enhanced security has meant increased expense through resource re-allocation. A higher level of security awareness and emergency preparedness exists among the Private Sector workforce in 2005.

Business, like government, strives for fiscal efficiency especially during periods of tight budgets and economic austerity. Thus, clarity of purpose avoids the squandering of finite resources. Preparedness is further improved through partnerships with Public Sector agencies.

Homeland security is becoming more centralized and inclusive; hence, the strong emphasis on Public-Private partnerships. Ideally, strong partnerships will facilitate information sharing and foster security awareness among both government and Private Sector leaders. A vast network of corporate security professionals can help the Public Sector achieve greater insight into Private Sector issues and the unique resources they possess. Only through collaboration can Private Sector assets be organized into a responsive system to deliver assets where they are needed most.
**Question 6** – In general, should your company’s philosophy and/or orientation underlying business continuity and incident response and recovery planning be adjusted/modified to address 21st Century terrorist threats – Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear?

NJBF members advocated taking a much broader view toward the problem of 21st Century terrorism. Operation PANDORA’S JAR demonstrated why NJBF members, in many instances, assume a global perspective in monitoring and preparing for emerging threats. Pre-9/11 planning did recognize some of the changes occurring within the national security environment. Since then, Private Sector awareness and readiness has accelerated in concert with the expanding capabilities of the various terrorist movements. Never before have non-state actors possessed such lethal means or technological potential. Evolving threats now demand a process of rigorous and vigorous plan and protocol reviews.

Private Sector companies must continually evaluate their level of preparedness and, should the unthinkable happen, respond accordingly. Existing plans and procedures should be heavily scrutinized against any anticipated threat – foreign or domestic. Response to a catastrophic event may be geared internally, cooperatively with government entities, or multifaceted and simultaneous. A desire for inclusive exercise and training programs has begun to chisel away at cultural and organizational impediments.

Enhancements in business continuity go hand-in-hand with innovative practices and new accommodations: designating private sector facilities as Points of Distribution (POD); developing procedures for long-term in-place sheltering; imposing robust HVAC security protocols to prevent the release of chemical agents or pathogens, etc. NJBF companies are adjusting their plans to ensure functional and system redundancies exist. Yet, preparation is more than just physical security. There is an attitudinal and cognitive component to homeland security as well. Thinking about tomorrow’s threats and how to counter them is precursory to formulating a strategic vision for the future.

**Module 4 Findings**

**Finding 4-1** – The Private Sector has a demonstrated need for education and training on the threats presented by biological agents and pathogens.

**Finding 4-2** - NJBF companies have and will mobilize equipment, facilities, material, and personnel during local and state emergencies in accordance with existing agreements.

**Finding 4-3** – Operating under a sustained RED threat advisory translates to increased costs and potential deleterious effects for the Private Sector.

**Finding 4-4** – Repercussions from expedient governmental decisions vary among Private Sector companies according to commodity/service produced, type of infrastructure and duration of the restrictions imposed.

**Finding 4-5** – Emerging Public-Private partnerships build synergy, improve information sharing and create new efficiencies of effort.

**Finding 4-6** – NJBF companies recognize the threat from 21st Century terrorism and are developing commensurate strategies and plans to protect their workforces, preserve the integrity of core business operations and assist local and state authorities following catastrophic attacks or disasters.
III. Open Items – Unanswered Questions/Unresolved Issues Raised during Exercise Play

A. Revise NJBF/NC4 Information Share System to include a bio-event reporting feature on anomalous absenteeism.
   1. Geographically based reporting for identification of potential case clusters
   2. Establish a reporting channel to New Jersey Department of Health and Senior Services
   3. Define what a bio-tracking mechanism would look like
   4. NJBF Security Council mentioned as a probable starting point for vetting the kind of information a prospective bio-attack/incident channel should contain

B. The State of New Jersey is exploring the feasibility of “looping” information from the Private Sector back to state agencies.
   1. The New Jersey State Police are studying how to integrate the E-TEAM platform with the NJBF/NC4 Information Share System
   2. Can the New Jersey Office of Emergency Management (NJOEM) provide plume modeling or similar graphics for display on the NJBF/NC4 Information System?
   3. Government agencies could benefit from Private Sector reports on unusual behavior/events.

C. The supervisor of the State Exercise Support Team asked exercise participants for their thoughts about appointing a private sector advocate during discussions to impose states of emergency within New Jersey.

IV. Exercise Conclusions

A. Each phase of Operation PANDORA’S JAR demonstrated the importance of timely, accurate, relevant, and actionable information for Private Sector preparation, prevention and a coordinated Public-Private response.

Recommendation – Continue to explore and leverage redundant communication systems designed to meet minimal standards of accuracy, timeliness, reliability and ease of use.

B. From a Private Sector perspective, involvement in domestic security encompasses all phases of emergency management starting with preparation and prevention. The Private Sector wants to avoid being thought about exclusively in terms of response and recovery.

Recommendation – Make available to the Public Sector corporate intellectual and experiential capacities to enhance state preparedness, prevention and mitigation programs.

C. Operation PANDORA’S JAR highlighted the advantages and importance of information sharing. Conversely, decision makers run a risk of being overwhelmed by the tremendous volume of available data.

Recommendation – Identify and define specific information requirements and develop a manageable list of intelligence sources to facilitate decision-making during crises.

D. The need for integrated communication systems and coordinated Public-Private Sector responses was a recurring theme voiced throughout Operation PANDORA’S JAR.
Recommendation – Conduct joint Public-Private Sector exercises to validate new and evolving communication and response plans and procedures.

E. Exercise play brought a number of proposed bio-terrorism strategies to the fore. Subjecting individual strategies to a “stress test,” either individually or collectively, can identify unforeseen problems and pitfalls beforehand.

Recommendation – NJBF members should select specific bio-terrorism strategies for testing in future exercise venues.

F. Throughout the exercise, NJBF companies articulated a genuine desire to assist government agencies and the public during catastrophic disasters or emergencies.

Recommendation – Add a Private Sector appendix to the state Emergency Operations Plan consisting of conceptual constructs that delineate the role of business during catastrophic events.

G. Decisions made by government in the midst of chaos and crisis can have severe unintended consequences for the Private Sector.

Recommendation – Continue exercising terrorist related scenarios depicting broad ranging government policies to illustrate the probable impact of Public Sector decisions on critical business activities.

H. Private Sector companies viewed expenditures for security and preparedness differently prior to 9-11. Now, these programs are increasingly seen as an obligatory cost center.

Recommendation – Continue tracking and documenting operational and maintenance costs for prevention and preparedness programs as testament of the Private Sector’s commitment to homeland security.
# ANNEX A – TABLETOP EXERCISE PARTICIPANTS

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<tr>
<th>Participant Name</th>
<th>NJBF Company</th>
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<tr>
<td>Gary Tarino</td>
<td>ADP</td>
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<td>John Williams</td>
<td>CIT Group</td>
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<td>Andy Palumbo</td>
<td>Johnson &amp; Johnson</td>
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<td>James Keyes</td>
<td>Lucent Technologies</td>
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<td>Merrily Powell</td>
<td>NC4, Inc.</td>
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<td>Ern Blackwelder</td>
<td>Business Executives for National Security</td>
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<td>Brian Dunlap</td>
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<td>William Marshall</td>
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<td>Tony Aquila</td>
<td>NJ Resources</td>
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<td>Roy Hulse</td>
<td>NJ Resources</td>
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<td>Bill Schnorbus</td>
<td>NJN Public Television &amp; Radio</td>
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<td>Bill Thorn</td>
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<td>Ryan McCormick</td>
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<td>Manu Malek</td>
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<td>Scott Para</td>
<td>United Water NJ</td>
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<td>Sgt Mike Small-Facilitator</td>
<td>NJSP Exercise Preparedness Unit</td>
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ANNEX B - MODULE 1 EXERCISE INJECTS

= Sequential Injects   = Random Injects

#1 POSTED 1 Dec 04 – In a Washington Herald article published 11-29-04, an unnamed source at the State Department allegedly said that money given to the Commonwealth of Euro-Asia is too little too late to stop the proliferation of WMD. He fears terrorists may have already acquired biological agents and manufacturing technologies due to inadequate inventory and security controls. “The horse fled the barn before the doors were closed” in an apparent reference to well intentioned anti-proliferation policies. “Unlike processed uranium, once such material hits the underground market it is impossible to track.”

#2 POSTED 1 Dec 04 – U.S. Middle Eastern policy continues to anger radical groups who fear America is forcing its governmental structures, culture and values on the region. Middle Eastern TV is broadcasting scenes of violent protests in the “Arab Street” and calls for calm from governments friendly to America who fear a growing restiveness among their own populations.

#3 POSTED 1 Dec 04 – Reports on TV news broadcasts highlight the growing tensions between the US and the Commonwealth of Euro-Asia over the accountability of biological and chemical weapons. International inspectors and observers have been denied access to Euro-Asian weapons research and storage facilities. Concerns over security and biased reporting are the reasons cited.

#4 POSTED 1 Dec 04 – Web sites with known sympathies for a loose coalition of extreme nationalist groups known as the Universal Adversary, have called for the withdrawal of all American forces and private contractors from the Middle East and Trans-Caucasus regions. Several sites say America “…will soon experience great sorrow for her crusader policies and infidel beliefs. Nations who help America, especially apostate regimes, will also feel the wrath of revenge by the very people they have enslaved for oil revenue.”

SKIPPED 1 Dec 04 – The United States and several European allies issue a communiqué calling for unhampered access to Commonwealth Biopreparat sites and international monitoring. An administration spokesperson reiterates Euro-Asia’s commitment to non-proliferation of WMD despite recent disagreements over access to sensitive sites.

SKIPPED 2 Dec 04 – American nightly news interviews a visiting Euro-Asian scientist about her country’s weapon’s program. Speaking through an interpreter, she says problems do exist with accountability and destruction of stockpiles; however, Euro-Asia is making slow but steady progress. Her concern centers on the mass exodus of weapons industry workers who are seeking higher wages and a better standard of living. She categorizes the recruitment of her fellow scientists by at least one well-known pariah nation as very aggressive.

SKIPPED 2 Dec 04 – Major domestic newspapers carry a wire story about the sudden upsurge in vitriolic attacks against the U.S. on known radical Websites denouncing American policies toward the Islamic World and “blind allegiance” to Israel.

#5 POSTED 2 Dec 04 – American intelligence and the Department of Homeland Security report a sharp “up-tick” in Universal Adversary activity and “chatter.”

#6 POSTED Dec 04 – New Jersey’s Terrorism Task Force has received several reports of suspicious persons conducting possible reconnaissance and surveillance at the Walt Whitman Bridge, Liberty IAP, several North Jersey Shopping Malls, and the Port of Newark.
#7 POSTED Dec 04 – A law enforcement advisory just issued contains an incident at a central Burlington County NJ wastewater treatment facility. A plant supervisor discovered the exit lane gate open and an unaccompanied blue Dodge Neon with a NY registration #RKE-297 parked in the lane. The car appeared abandoned. The registration is traced to a car rental agency in New York City. Local police are investigating.

#8 POSTED Dec 04 – Police in the capitol city of a Red Sea Sultanate foil an attempted truck bombing of a major U.S. company building.

#9 POSTED Dec 04 – Cleaning crews at JFK IAP in New York City find pamphlets written in Arabic in the plane’s lavatory while refreshing an arriving flight from North Africa. Reportedly, the pamphlets advocate the cause and objectives of the Universal Adversary.

#10 POSTED 3 Dec 04 – Drawing on recently declassified intelligence, an article in a leading British scientific journal estimates the Euro-Asian Cold War biological weapons stockpile at more than one hundred tons of Anthrax, Brucellosis, Plague, Tularemia, Venezuelan Equine Encephalitis, Ebola and Smallpox. Euro-Asian military doctrine considered biological agents a strategic weapon for direct attack against Western military installations and major cities. The amount mentioned in the journal article is far greater than that previously claimed by the Euro-Asian Defense Minister.

#11 POSTED Dec 04 – A new denial of service “worm” has struck the networks belonging to several prominent companies within the financial and energy sectors. The State of New Jersey Home Page has also been defaced and slogans denouncing an upcoming trade mission to Israel posted on it.

#12 POSTED 3 Dec 04 – A coalition of U.S. Senators from both parties just called a news conference in Washington D.C. to announce their intention to lead a fight on the Hill for economic and trade sanctions against the Commonwealth of Euro-Asia until compliance with all international treaties governing proliferation is observed.

#13 POSTED Dec 04 – Thousands of Muslim workers employed by the leading U.S. communications provider on the Indian Sub-Continent walk off the job to protest “U.S. atrocities against the Islamic people.”

#14 POSTED Dec 04 – Two near simultaneous car bombs have detonated outside a police station and a major shopping area in an Amsterdam suburb. Unconfirmed casualty reports put the number of fatalities at four with nearly two-dozen wounded. Dutch troops are serving as UN peacekeepers in the Balkans and Afghanistan under NATO.

#15 POSTED Dec 04 – A Universal Adversary Website calls upon the “Islamic Nation” to deny the U.S. and her G-8 allies access to Middle East and Trans-Caucasus oil and gas fields. “Depriving America and her sycophants the resources belonging to True Believers will quickly bring these ruthless decadent and depraved governments to their knees.”

#16 POSTED 3 Dec 04 – Officials at the Office of Homeland Security are deliberating an increase in the Homeland Security Advisory Alert Level based on the current threat matrix. (Last Exercise Inject before Tabletop)