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Excerpts from Aristotle's POETICS (trans. S. H. Butcher) 

 Tragedy is an imitation of an action that is serious, complete, and of a certain magnitude; in language embellished . . .; in the form of action, not of narrative; through pity and fear effecting the proper purgation of these emotions.

 Tragedy must have six parts, which parts determine its quality--namely, Plot, Character, Diction, Thought, Spectacle, Song. . . . The Plot is the first principle, and, as it were, the soul of a tragedy; Character holds the second place. . . . Character is that which reveals moral purpose, showing what kind of things a man chooses or avoids. . . . Thought, on the other hand, is found when something is proved to be or not to be, or a general maxim is enunciated. 

 Plots are either Simple or Complex . . .  An action is Simple when the change of fortune takes place without Reversal of Intention and without Recognition.  A Complex action is one in which the change is accompanied by such Reversal, or by Recognition, or both. . . .  It makes all the difference whether any given event is a case of propter hoc or post hoc. 

 Reversal of Intention is a change by which the action veers round to its opposite, subject always to our rule of probablity or necessity. . . . Recognition, as the name implies, is a change from ignorance to knowledge. 

 A perfect tragedy should be arranged not on the simple but on the complex plan.  It should moreover imitate actions which excite pity and fear, this being the distinctive mark of tragic imitation.  It follows plainly that the change of fortune presented must not be the spectacle of a wholly virtuous man brought from prosperity to adversity: for this moves neither pity nor fear; it merely shocks us.  Nor that of a bad man passing from adversity to prosperity: for nothing can be more alien to the spirit of Tragedy; it possesses no single tragic quality; it neither satisfies the moral sense, nor calls forth pity or fear.  Nor again should the downfall of an utter villain be exhibited.  A plot of this kind would, doubtless, satisfy the moral sense, but it would inspire neither pity nor fear; for pity is aroused by unmerited misfortune, fear by the misfortune of a man like ouselves. . . . There remains, then, the character between these two extremes, that of a man who is not eminently good or just, yet whose misfortune is brought about not by vice or depravity, but by some error or frailty [hamarteia, often translated as "tragic flaw"].  He must be one who is highly renowned and prosperous. 

 What are the circumstances which strike us as terrible or pitiful?  Actions capable of this effect must happen between persons who are either friends or enemies or are indifferent to one another.  If an enemy kills an enemy, there is nothing to excite pity either in the act or in the intention--except so far as suffering in itself is pitiful.  So again with indifferent persons.  But when the tragic incident occurs between those who are near and dear to one another--if, for example, a brother kills a brother, a son his father, a mother her son, or any other deed of the kind is done--these are the situations to be looked for by the poet.